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CNSA 2.0: Requirements, Timeline, and What Compliance Means for Suppliers

Compliance and migration ·

The dates are set. For suppliers, CNSA 2.0 arrives as a contract term.

The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 is among the most specific post-quantum requirements any government has published. It names the algorithms and fixes the parameter levels, and the policy that enforces it sets dated milestones beginning January 1, 2027. Most companies that feel its effect are not government agencies. They are suppliers, and the requirement reaches them through a solicitation, a customer questionnaire, or a contract clause.

This article sets out what CNSA 2.0 requires, who it binds, and when. It then addresses the questions we are asked most often by product and legal teams: what a company can accurately say about CNSA 2.0 compliance, and what to settle before making a commitment.

What CNSA 2.0 is and who it binds

The National Security Agency announced CNSA 2.0 in September 2022 as the set of quantum-resistant algorithms approved for U.S. National Security Systems. It replaces CNSA 1.0, introduced in 2016, which in turn replaced Suite B.

CNSA 2.0 is an algorithm suite, and policy gives it force. CNSSP 15, the Committee on National Security Systems policy on the use of public standards, specifies which commercial algorithms National Security Systems must use. NSA’s advisory applies to all National Security System use of public cryptographic algorithms, on classified and unclassified systems alike. The current CNSSP 15 is dated December 2024, was signed on February 28, 2025, and is often cited by its March 2025 release. It lists the CNSA 2.0 algorithms, deprecates the quantum-vulnerable algorithms of CNSA 1.0, sets the transition dates, and cancels the waivers granted under the previous version. National Security Presidential Memorandum 12, issued June 12, 2026, confirms the policy’s standing: CNSSP 15, a successor policy, or interim guidance from the National Manager constitutes the commercial cryptographic standard for National Security Systems.

The audience is defined narrowly. NSA’s FAQ, now at version 2.2 of October 2026, identifies the owners and operators of National Security Systems and the vendors that build for them, and states that NSA does not mandate requirements on any entity outside National Security Systems. NIST sets cryptographic standards for other government systems. The same documents recognize the practical effect beyond that boundary. The FAQ notes that interoperability can lead a broader community to adopt the requirements, and CNSSP 15 directs departments and agencies to consider applying it to other systems where information may be shared with a National Security System.

A National Security System need not be run by the government. The statutory definition covers a system used or operated by an agency, by a contractor of an agency, or by another organization on behalf of an agency, where the system’s function meets the statutory criteria. A contractor that operates such a system is inside the requirement, and is not merely a supplier to it. NIST SP 800-59 provides the method agencies use to make the determination.

The algorithms and parameter levels

CNSA 2.0 selects a small number of algorithms and one parameter level for each general-purpose function.

Function Algorithm Specification CNSA 2.0 parameters
Symmetric encryption AES FIPS 197 256-bit keys
Key establishment ML-KEM FIPS 203 ML-KEM-1024
Digital signatures, including software and firmware signing ML-DSA FIPS 204 ML-DSA-87
Hashing SHA-2 FIPS 180-4 SHA-384 or SHA-512
Software and firmware signing only LMS, XMSS NIST SP 800-208 All approved parameter sets; NSA recommends LMS with SHA-256/192

The suite also permits SHA3-384 and SHA3-512 for one narrow purpose: internal hardware functions such as boot-time integrity checks. SHA-3 is not approved as a general-purpose hash.

Three points in this table matter for product claims.

  • NIST approval is broader than CNSA 2.0. FIPS 203 and FIPS 204 each define several parameter sets. CNSA 2.0 accepts only the highest. A product that implements ML-KEM-768 conforms to a NIST standard and does not meet CNSA 2.0.
  • Some NIST-standardized algorithms are outside the suite. NSA’s FAQ states that SLH-DSA is not part of CNSA and is not approved for any use in National Security Systems. It also states that the pre-hash variant of ML-DSA is not allowed at the present time, a restriction NSA’s draft protocol profiles repeat, and that NSA does not currently plan to add future NIST post-quantum standards.
  • A hybrid is not compliant merely because it includes a CNSA 2.0 algorithm. NSA does not require hybrid solutions for security. Where a protocol needs one, as with IKEv2, the FAQ states that only the hybrid NSA has identified is considered CNSA 2.0 compliant. It directs that non-standardized quantum-resistant solutions not be used on mission systems except where NSA specifically recommends them. NSA’s draft IPsec profile shows what an approved exception looks like: it requires ML-KEM-1024 and also permits the CNSA 1.0 key establishment algorithms, because ML-KEM-1024 is too large for the first IKEv2 exchange.

The transition timeline

CNSSP 15 states the dates that apply. NSA’s 2022 advisory, published before the policy was updated, set out an earlier timetable by category of technology. The two are often confused, and they give different answers.

The policy dates in CNSSP 15

Date Requirement
Through December 31, 2025 CNSA 1.0 algorithms remain acceptable in all products
Beginning January 1, 2027 CNSA 2.0 algorithms are required in all new products and services that provide cryptographic protection for users or for updates
By December 31, 2030 Equipment and services that cannot or will not be updated to CNSA 2.0 must be phased out and replaced
By December 31, 2031 CNSA 2.0 algorithms are mandated for all protocol use

Each requirement applies unless NSA has published an exception or granted a waiver. The policy states that some classes of system will not be able to transition on this schedule and that NSA will identify them and provide different timelines. Its overall objective is to complete the transition by 2035, the goal stated in National Security Memorandum 10, and NSA’s FAQ states that NSA intends all National Security Systems to be quantum-resistant well ahead of that date.

The earlier category timetable

The 2022 advisory lists the timetable NSA then anticipated for each category. By the first date, products were to support CNSA 2.0 and prefer it. By the second, they were to use it exclusively.

Technology category Support and prefer Use exclusively
Software and firmware signing 2025 2030
Web browsers, servers, and cloud services 2025 2033
Traditional networking equipment, such as VPNs and routers 2026 2030
Operating systems 2027 2033
Niche equipment, such as constrained devices and large PKI systems 2030 2033
Custom applications and legacy equipment Update or replace by 2033

The policy dates are the default, and the category timetable is now of historical interest. The advisory remains published and is still widely quoted, including its 2033 dates. NSA’s later documents do not use it. The current FAQ states the CNSSP 15 dates and no longer includes the category table. NSA’s draft guidance for its Commercial Solutions for Classified program restates the CNSSP 15 dates and says the category timelines will be simplified into a single program timeline, with all registered solutions quantum-resistant by 2030. NSA has presented 2027, 2030, and 2031 as the default timeline, noting that particular product lines or technologies may receive their own. A date later than 2031 should therefore be relied on only where NSA has published an exception for that class of system or granted a waiver.

“Prefer” and “exclusive” describe different obligations. A product that prefers CNSA 2.0 can still negotiate an older algorithm with a peer that cannot use the new one. A product that uses it exclusively cannot. CNSSP 15 draws the same line: CNSA 2.0 is to be preferred in protocol negotiations once compatible equipment is deployed, and it is mandated for all protocol use by the end of 2031. A product roadmap, and any promise based on it, should say which of the two the company means.

Fielded equipment is included. The FAQ states that systems currently in use must upgrade in a timely fashion unless they receive a waiver, that the transition may require a hardware refresh, and that NSA expects these transitions to be complete by December 31, 2030. NSA advises buyers to acquire equipment with enough memory and processing capacity to run the new algorithms.

Why procurement moves first

The first date to arrive is the one that governs purchasing. NSA’s FAQ summarizes CNSSP 15 as requiring CNSA 2.0 algorithms in all new acquisitions for National Security Systems by January 1, 2027. NIAP describes the consequence for contracting in its Policy #33: beginning January 1, 2027, government contracts must include language requiring that products used in National Security Systems implement post-quantum cryptography or be updateable to implement it. Program offices write requirements well ahead of the acquisition they govern.

For a supplier, this changes the order of events. The question arrives as a requirement in a solicitation, before the customer’s own migration is complete and often before the supplier’s validated implementation is available. A supplier that waits for the 2030 and 2031 dates to plan will be answering procurement questions without the evidence to support its answers.

NSA has addressed what happens when no compliant product is available, and its answer is a contract term. The FAQ recognizes that fully certified solutions may not exist in some product categories by the end of 2026. In that case a deployment may be accepted on the vendor’s contractual commitment to provide a CNSA 2.0 update, combined with a realistic deployment plan that meets the 2030 deadline, and the commitment must be tracked and reported. NSA adds a caution: some components, such as firmware update mechanisms, likely cannot be transitioned after purchase and should be quantum-resistant when bought.

Validation is part of the requirement, and it has its own clock.

  • Evaluation. Under CNSSP 11, commercial products acquired to protect National Security Systems must comply with the requirements of the National Information Assurance Partnership and, where applicable, the FIPS cryptographic validation programs. The FAQ adds that this will typically include modules validated under NIST’s Cryptographic Module Validation Program.

  • Certification gates. Placement on NIAP’s Product Compliant List makes a product eligible for procurement for use in National Security Systems. NIAP’s Policy #33, dated August 31, 2026 and effective January 1, 2027, sets two sets of gates for that list, and each is measured against every cryptographic function in the product.

    Product does not meet Not accepted into evaluation from Not posted to the Product Compliant List from
    CNSA 1.0 minimum requirements January 1, 2027 July 1, 2027
    CNSA 2.0 requirements January 1, 2028 January 1, 2029

    A product that falls short of CNSA 1.0 is also limited to a two-year certificate with no extension. In both cases the certificate will be archived at a date NIAP has yet to set, regardless of the time remaining on it. NSA’s FAQ states that NSA expects archiving to begin in late 2027 and that a product with an archived certificate will not comply with CNSSP 11. NIAP will also prioritize its validation resources for products that fully meet CNSA 2.0, then for those that partially meet it. The policy applies to products certified by NIAP or by a partner scheme, and its one stated exception is AES-128 for Bluetooth.

  • Signing. A product that only verifies signatures needs algorithm validation. Signers that are themselves National Security Systems must use validated hardware, and the FAQ states that waivers of that requirement will not be granted.

  • Non-compliant products. A commercial product that does not use CNSA 2.0 algorithms cannot be used to protect a National Security System unless NSA has provided specific written guidance otherwise.

Selling to the Department of War

The Department of War has added its own requirements, and they reach systems that are not National Security Systems.

  • Department-wide dates. The Department’s Post Quantum Cryptography Strategy states that all of its systems must support post-quantum cryptography or be phased out no later than December 31, 2030, and must use it no later than December 31, 2031, unless otherwise noted. National Security Systems must support CNSA 2.0. The strategy directs Components to build these requirements into contract requirements and acquisition decisions.
  • Approval before acquisition. A November 2025 memorandum from the Department’s Chief Information Officer requires Components to obtain intake approval before testing, piloting, or acquiring any post-quantum technology, and deployment approval before deploying it. The requirement expressly covers technologies described as quantum resistant or quantum resilient.
  • Excluded approaches. The same memorandum bars the use of quantum key distribution to provide confidentiality, authentication, or key distribution, and directs Components not to procure commercial solutions that rely on pre-shared keys for quantum resistance. The line is narrower than it first appears. NSA’s own Commercial Solutions for Classified program uses pre-shared keys as a near-term protection for long-lived classified data, and the memorandum gives symmetric solutions registered with that program until December 31, 2031. A supplier should establish which regime a customer’s deployment falls under before describing a pre-shared-key design as acceptable.

For a supplier, the practical effect is a second gate. A product can use the right algorithms and still require the Chief Information Officer’s approval before a Component may buy or deploy it, and a product marketed as quantum-resistant on the strength of an excluded approach will not qualify.

Beyond National Security Systems

A company with no government customer can still acquire a CNSA 2.0 obligation. It does so by contract.

  • Flow-down terms. A prime contractor that must deliver a compliant system passes the requirement to the suppliers whose components perform the cryptography. The supplier’s obligation is then defined by its own agreement, which may be broader or vaguer than the government requirement behind it.
  • Customer benchmarks. Buyers in finance, critical infrastructure, and other regulated sectors use CNSA 2.0 as a reference point because it is specific. A questionnaire that asks whether a product is “CNSA 2.0 compliant” may be asking about algorithms, validation, default configuration, or all three.
  • Marketing claims. A statement on a product page is a representation. It can be relied on by a customer, examined in diligence, and measured against the facts by a regulator or a counterparty.

In each case the legal question is the same: what exactly has the company promised, and what evidence supports it?

CNSA 2.0 and the NIST transition schedule

CNSA 2.0 and NIST’s guidance are separate instruments with different audiences. NIST’s standards and transition guidance apply to federal systems other than National Security Systems. Executive Order 14412 requires agencies to transition high value assets and high impact systems to post-quantum key establishment by December 31, 2030 and to post-quantum digital signatures by December 31, 2031, and it excludes National Security Systems from that direction. OMB’s implementing memorandum, M-26-15, likewise states that it does not apply to national security systems. NSA’s FAQ states that the executive order’s timelines do not change CNSSP 15, and that National Security Systems will transition on the CNSSP 15 schedule, which is at least as fast.

A supplier that sells to both civilian agencies and defense customers may therefore face two sets of requirements for one product. Meeting the NIST standard does not establish CNSA 2.0 compliance, because of the parameter levels described above. The two regimes also treat hybrids differently. M-26-15 describes a hybrid architecture as a tool civilian agencies may use to manage risk during migration, after weighing its tradeoffs. NSA does not require hybrids and accepts only those it has identified. A configuration acceptable to a civilian agency may therefore not be acceptable for a National Security System. Our analysis of PQC migration timelines and readiness evidence addresses the civilian schedule.

What “CNSA 2.0 compliant” can accurately mean

For a National Security System, NSA’s FAQ gives a strict answer: a system is considered compliant and quantum-resistant only when it uses CNSA 2.0 algorithms in an NSA-approved manner, such as when validated against the appropriate protection profile. NSA also distinguishes a system that is fully quantum-resistant from one that is only partially so, where some cryptographic services have been upgraded and others have not.

In commercial use the phrase has no single definition, and that is the source of most of the risk we see. A claim of compliance can refer to at least four different facts.

Algorithm support
The product implements the CNSA 2.0 algorithms at the required parameter levels. This says nothing about whether the implementation has been validated or which algorithms are used by default.
Validated implementation
The algorithm implementation or cryptographic module has completed the relevant NIST validation. The validation covers a specific version, platform, and configuration.
Evaluated product
The product has been evaluated against the applicable protection profile. Evaluation follows validation and depends on the profile being available for that product type.
Deployed configuration
The product as shipped and configured prefers, or exclusively uses, CNSA 2.0. A product can support the suite and still negotiate older algorithms in the field.

A statement is accurate when it identifies which of these facts it asserts and for which version of the product. “CNSA 2.0 ready” and “CNSA 2.0 capable” are not defined terms. Used without qualification, they invite the reader to assume the strongest meaning.

NSA’s draft protocol profiles show how much turns on configuration. Its TLS 1.3 profile treats compliance as a property of each connection: a compliant implementation must offer the CNSA algorithms first and use them when the peer supports them, and if any aspect of compliance is not achieved, the connection is not CNSA compliant. A connection negotiated at TLS 1.2 or lower cannot be compliant. A product may therefore be capable of compliance and still make non-compliant connections in the field. These profiles are Internet-Drafts and are not yet final.

The same analysis applies to dependencies. Many products obtain their cryptography from a library, a hardware module, or a cloud service. The product’s claim can be no stronger than the supplier’s, and the supplier’s validation may cover a different version from the one that ships.

Questions to settle before signing

Before a company responds to a solicitation, accepts a flow-down clause, or publishes a claim, we recommend that it be able to answer the following.

  1. Which requirement applies? Identify the source: CNSSP 15 through a government contract, a flow-down term, or a customer’s own standard. Record the edition and the date.
  2. Which product and version? Tie every statement to a version, platform, and configuration. Note what is shipping and what is on the roadmap.
  3. Support, prefer, or exclusive? State which behavior the product delivers today and which it will deliver by the committed date.
  4. What has been validated, and for how long? Identify the validation records for the implementation or module, and confirm that they cover the version supplied. For a product on NIAP’s Product Compliant List, determine which Policy #33 gate applies and when the certificate will lapse or be archived.
  5. What depends on a supplier? List the third-party components that perform cryptography and the commitments their suppliers have made in writing.
  6. What happens if a date moves? Address delay in a supplier’s roadmap or a validation queue, and allocate the consequences in the agreement. Where a customer accepts a product on a commitment to deliver a CNSA 2.0 update, define the update, the date, and the reporting that supports it.
  7. Who may need an exception? Where a product cannot meet a date, determine whether NSA has published an exception for that class of system, whether the customer can seek a waiver, and what the supplier must provide to support it.

How CipherLaw advises

CipherLaw advises suppliers, integrators, and investors on post-quantum requirements and the commitments built on them. We review solicitations and flow-down terms, test compliance statements against implementation and validation evidence, and draft the contract language that allocates migration risk. Our PQC compliance practice describes the scope of that work, and our standards and IP practice addresses the patent and licensing rights that bear on an implementation.

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